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Abstract
Violence against women and girls (VAWG) is a global problemwith profound consequences. Although
there is a growing body of evidence on the effectiveness of VAWG prevention interventions, economic
data are scarce. We carried out a cross-country study to examine the costs of VAWG prevention inter-
ventions in low- and middle-income countries. We collected primary cost data on six different pilot
VAWG prevention interventions in six countries: Ghana, Kenya, Pakistan, Rwanda, South Africa and
Zambia. The interventions varied in their delivery platforms, target populations, settings and theories
of change. We adopted a micro-costing methodology. We calculated total costs and a number of unit
costs common across interventions (e.g. cost per beneficiary reached). We used the pilot-level cost
data tomodel the expected total costs and unit costs of five interventions scaled up to the national level.
Total costs of the pilots varied between US $208 000 in a small group intervention in South Africa to
US $2 788 000 in a couples and community-based intervention in Rwanda. Staff costs were the largest
cost input across all interventions; consequently, total costs were sensitive to staff time use and
salaries. The cost per beneficiary reached in the pilots ranged from US $4 in a community-based
intervention in Ghana to US $1324 for one-to-one counselling in Zambia. When scaled up to the nation-
al level, total costs ranged fromUS $32million in Ghana to US $168million in Pakistan. Cost per benefi-
ciary reached at scale decreased for all interventions compared to the pilots, except for school-based
interventions due to differences in student density per school between the pilot and the national
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average. The costs of delivering VAWG prevention vary greatly due to differences in the geographical
reach, number of intervention components and the complexity of adapting the intervention to the coun-
try. Cost-effectiveness analyses are necessary to determine the value for money of interventions.
Keywords: Costs, violence against women and girls, violence prevention
Introduction
Violence against women and girls (VAWG) is a global problem with
profound consequences. Between 30% and 65% of women and ado-
lescent girls over the age of 15 years in sub-Saharan Africa, and over
40% of those in South Asia, have experienced intimate partner vio-
lence (IPV) (Devries et al., 2013b). A human rights violation, vio-
lence affects women and girls across all socio-economic strata and
ages, in both peace and conflict settings (Dartnall and Jewkes,
2013), and has serious public health, social and economic implica-
tions (McCollister et al., 2010; Devries et al., 2013a; Duvvury et al.,
2013; Stockl et al., 2013).
Governments and international donors, such as the United
Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID) and
the World Bank, have invested in VAWG prevention pilots and pro-
grammes (Global Gender-based Violence Task Force, 2017; World
Bank, 2017) in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). The
body of evidence on VAWG prevention interventions is rapidly
growing and a greater understanding on effective prevention mecha-
nisms across settings, target populations and delivery platforms is
emerging (Department for International Development, 2014; What
Works to Prevent Violence, 2018). However, the United Kingdom’s
Independent Commission for Aid Impact and others have high-
lighted that the reach of existing VAWG-focused programmes is not
commensurate with the magnitude of the challenge (Independent
Commission for Aid Impact, 2016). Evidence on the costs of VAWG
prevention is critical to support the economic analyses required to
justify and plan any scale-up, yet, presently there is almost no evi-
dence on the resource requirements of VAWG prevention to inform
policymakers considering investments at scale.
Estimating the costs of public health and social interventions in
LMICs requires substantial primary data collection given the dearth
of routine financial reporting systems. To date, two economic
evaluations of VAWG prevention interventions in LMICs have been
published. Evidence on costs and cost-effectiveness are available for
the Intervention with Microfinance for AIDS & Gender Equity
(IMAGE), a combined microfinance and gender training intervention
to prevent IPV in rural South Africa (Jan et al., 2011); and SASA!, a
community mobilization intervention in urban Uganda (Michaels-
Igbokwe et al., 2016). These studies have suggested that the cost per
past person-year free from IPV experience is around 2011 US $460
(adjusted to 2016 US $496) in SASA!. In the case of IMAGE, the
intervention was potentially cost-effective, particularly at scale.
What Works to Prevent Violence against Women and Girls
(What Works) is a global programme building evidence on violence
prevention interventions in 13 LMICs (What Works to Prevent
Violence, 2018). The programme provides a unique opportunity to
estimate and compare the costs of a multiplicity of delivery plat-
forms and target populations, informing those wishing to scale up
VAWG prevention further.
This study has two aims: first, to present the total costs and unit
costs of six VAWG prevention interventions piloted through different
platforms (communities, workshops for individuals and small groups,
schools) and evaluated using randomized controlled trials as part of
the ‘What Works’ programme (i.e. costing ‘implementation in a re-
search setting’) in six countries: Ghana, Kenya, Pakistan, Rwanda,
South Africa and Zambia; and second, to use these primary data to
model the costs of scaling up these interventions at a national level,
presenting total costs and unit costs for five of the six countries.
Methods
Interventions
We collected the costs of six VAWG prevention interventions in six
LMICs. These interventions were piloted and assessed using
randomized controlled trials (What Works to Prevent Violence,
Key Messages
• Interventions to prevent violence against women and girls (VAWG) can be delivered in a multiplicity of platforms,
through different components, across various settings and with different levels of intensity. The costs involved in deliv-
ering VAWG prevention services largely reflect these intervention characteristics.
• In the six interventions costed, the cost per beneficiary ranged widely, from US $4 in a community-based intervention in
Ghana to US $1324 for one-to-one counselling in Zambia; cost-effectiveness analyses will determine whether more re-
source-intensive interventions generate better value for money.
• VAWG prevention interventions are staff intensive. Staff-related costs make up the biggest proportion of costs across all
interventions, and total costs are very sensitive to staff salaries. Training frontline staff is a large investment; ensuring
retention of staff is essential in maintaining costs low in the long term.
• The cost per beneficiary will likely change when interventions are scaled up from pilots to the national level. Cost mod-
elling suggests that unit costs can decrease in community-based and workshop-based interventions. Conversely, unit
costs can increase in interventions with fixed platforms, such as schools, when the average ratio of students-per-school
is lower at the national level than in the pilot (due to high fixed costs at the delivery site).
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2018). Further information on the six trial can be found elsewhere
(Gibbs et al., 2017; Kane et al., 2017; McFarlane et al., 2017; Stern
et al., 2018; Addo-Lartey et al., 2019; Baiocchi et al., 2019). The
interventions varied by delivery platforms: (1) social norms change
interventions delivered to communities (Rural Response System, or
RRS, in Ghana), (2) workshop-based small-group sessions (Stepping
Stones and Creating Futures, or SSCF, in South Africa), (3)
classroom-based school interventions (IMPower and Sources of
Strength, or IMPower/SOS, in Kenya and the Positive Child and
Youth Development Programme delivered by the organization Right
to Play, or RTP, in Pakistan), (4) one-to-one sessions on mental health
issues (VATU in Zambia) and (5) a combination of workshop-based
small-group sessions with couples and a social norms change inter-
vention delivered to communities (Indashyikirwa in Rwanda).
The interventions also varied in terms of setting (urban/rural),
coverage (from one city to several regions), theories of change
approaches (harmful gender norms change, self-defence, skills and
livelihoods building) and durations of implementation
(12–31 months). Full information on the interventions costed is
available elsewhere (Jewkes et al., 2019), and a summary is pre-
sented in Table 1.
Costing
To ensure comparability across intervention types, we developed a
standardized methodology and a set of guidelines for the economic
evaluation of complex (i.e. multi-component and/or multi-platform)
programmes designed to prevent VAWG in LMICs (Ferrari et al.,
2018; 2019). Our methodology follows best practice established in
the Global Health Costing Consortium Reference Case (Vassall
et al., 2020) and is consistent with the Second US Panel on Cost-
effectiveness in Health and Medicine (Sanders et al., 2016) and the
CHEERS guidelines (Husereau et al., 2013), as well as with DfID’s
‘value for money’ framework for the assessment of economy, effi-
ciency, effectiveness and equity of its programmes (Department for
International Development, 2011).
We estimated costs of the start-up and implementation phases.
The start-up phase was divided into three sub-phases: (1) intervention
development, defined as the period when the curriculum or manual
of activities was initially designed, (2) adaptation, defined as the pro-
cess of making the curriculum or manual specific to the target popu-
lation and (3) set-up, defined as the period of community entry and
training of frontline staff. The implementation phase spanned the
time between when the first and last clients received the intervention.
All three sub-phases were costed for IMPower/SOS (Kenya),
SSCF (South Africa) and VATU (Zambia). For RTP (Pakistan) and
Indashyikirwa (Rwanda), only set-up and adaption costs were
included. RTP’s development sub-phase started in 2008, and
resource-use data were not available; it therefore could not be
costed. Indashyikirwa is a multiple-component intervention, partial-
ly based on SASA! and Journeys of Transformation (previously
developed interventions) but with some newly developed compo-
nents. Given the complexity of Indashyikirwa’s start-up phase, it
was difficult to disaggregate resources used strictly to develop new
components vs adaptation of existing components. For analytical
simplicity, we classified all costs as adaptation (vis-a`-vis develop-
ment) and tested this assumption in sensitivity analysis. For RRS
(Ghana), only the set-up sub-phase was costed. The intervention
was developed over 15 years prior to the pilot, and no financial
records were available. Furthermore, RRS did not go through an
adaptation phase before the implementation.
A full financial and economic micro-costing was carried out for
each intervention. Data on resource utilization were obtained
through structured interviews, review of financial records, monitor-
ing and evaluations data and travel logbooks. For financial costs,
purchase prices were used, with replacement prices for capital
goods, commonly available from project records. Costs were sepa-
rated by phase and sub-phase. Most costs were calculated through a
bottom-up approach (measuring quantities in a granular manner at
the activity and sub-activity level). When unfeasible, a top-down ap-
proach (dividing overall costs by number of outputs) was used to
calculate some administration and management costs.
Costs were broken down by input type (e.g. supplies, staff sal-
aries or utilities) and allocated to a number of activities common
across interventions (management, administration, technical sup-
port, travel, maintenance/cleaning and other) and intervention-
specific core activities (e.g. community sensitization or counselling).
Research costs were excluded. Implementing organization monitor-
ing and evaluation costs were included as these would be expected
to be incurred in routine service delivery. Allocations between activ-
ities and sub-activities were based on staff time use and financial
and programmatic records (Ferrari et al., 2018; 2019) (see
Supplementary Appendix S1 for more information on the sources of
resource use and price data for each type of input).
Staff time use was collected through structured interviews, time-
sheet review and direct observation. When volunteers did not receive
a stipend, their time was valued by applying a replacement value
determined as the salary of the lowest-tier health worker in each set-
ting (Kasteng et al., 2016). Cost data were disaggregated by delivery
site where possible.
Costs were collected in the currency and year in which they were
incurred. They were converted to 2016 values using the World Bank
gross domestic product (GDP) deflator and to US Dollars using aver-
age annual exchange rates (OANDA, 2018). Capital costs were
annuitized over the expected life of each item, and a standard 3%
discount rate was applied. Start-up costs were treated as a capital
item. The useful life of the different sub-phases of the start-up period
was estimated to be 10 years for development, 10 years for adapta-
tion and 5 years for set-up. The durations for the development and
adaptation sub-phases were estimated by eliciting the expert opinion
of senior staff members of the implementing organizations and tri-
angulated against the evidence base in the literature (Jan et al.,
2011; Michaels-Igbokwe et al., 2016). For the set-up sub-phase, we
assumed the average length of the political cycle, as set-up activities
often require political buy-in from leaders in the community and,
therefore, may need to be repeated at the start of each political cycle.
We tested these assumptions in sensitivity analysis.
Descriptive cost data analysis
We calculated a total cost, as well as cost per phase, and present
results by input type. We calculated three common unit costs across
interventions: cost per frontline worker trained, cost per session
delivered and cost per beneficiary reached. We acknowledge that the
term ‘unit cost’ has various definitions depending on the purpose of
the costing and the methodological approach. We defined a unit
cost as a mean cost per unit of output, consistent with the Global
Health Costing Consortium Reference Case and VAWG-specific
guidelines (Ferrari et al., 2019; Vassall et al., 2020). Unit costs were
calculated by obtaining the total cost of the core activity (e.g. total
costs of training frontline staff), including both direct and indirect
costs, and dividing by the total number of units (e.g. total number of
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volunteers trained). Other unit costs are available from the authors
upon request.
The number of beneficiaries was determined with an intention to
treat approach, in line with methodological best practice for evalua-
tions alongside trials. For workshop-based interventions (SSCF,
VATU), this is the number of beneficiaries enrolled at baseline, irre-
spective of the number of sessions completed. For community- and
school-based interventions (RTP, IMPower/SOS, RRS and
Indashyikirwa), which were based on the model of social diffusion
where community members (either villagers or pupils in school)
were exposed directly or indirectly, the number of beneficiaries was
defined as the total number of people within the relevant target
population in each cluster (i.e. village or school). Indashyikirwa
(Rwanda) had an initial workshop-based component with couples
that fed into the community-based approach; however, in this paper,
we focus on the beneficiaries at the community level.
Uncertainty analysis
To account for uncertainty, we carried out a number of one-way de-
terministic sensitivity analyses. We examined the sensitivity of costs
to the following parameters: staff salaries, replacement value of vol-
unteer labour, working days per year, prices of fuel, useful life of
adaptation and set-up costs and discount rates (see Supplementary
Appendix S2 for details).
There were discrepancies in perceptions of time use between those
reported by staff and those reported by the research team in VATU
(Zambia) over which full agreement could not be reached. Due to this
extra uncertainty, we carried out an additional one-way deterministic
sensitivity analysis varying the four parameters around which there
was disagreement: percentage of time spent on research activities, per-
centage of time spent on management activities, amount of time
devoted by supervisors to travel, and the inclusion of a one-day feed-
back session in the start-up phase (see Supplementary Appendix S3).
Given the difficulties in separating out development and adaptation
costs, we also carried out a one-way deterministic sensitivity analysis
for Indashyikirwa (Rwanda) to test the effect on total costs of differ-
ent assumptions on the distribution between development costs vs
adaptation costs (see Supplementary Appendix S4).
Scale-up analysis
We modelled the costs at national scale in five out of the six inter-
ventions. We excluded VATU (Zambia) given the uncertainty about
‘implementation in a research setting’ costs and non-availability of
information to model scale-up assumptions.
Cost data from the pilots were used to estimate costs of full-scale
intervention delivery at the national level (so-called ‘scale-up’ costs).
Scale-up can be conceptualized across different dimensions. The
World Health Organization suggests that scaling up can be applied to
inputs, outputs, outcomes or impact (World Health Organization,
2008). While the ultimate goal of an intervention is to increase im-
pact, this analysis focuses on the scale-up of inputs required, which at
scale may or may not sustain the effectiveness achieved in the pilots.
An increase in inputs at scale requires increased resources (i.e.
increased total costs), but costs are not typically a linear function of
the number of beneficiaries reached at scale. As interventions are
scaled up, some costs remain fixed (i.e. costs that remain constant re-
gardless of the number of outputs) such as the costs of adapting an
intervention to a new country, while others should be treated as vari-
able (i.e. costs that vary according to the level of output). Some costs
vary as a function of the number of beneficiaries reached (e.g. costs of
printing education materials for each beneficiary), while others vary
as a function of intermediate outputs, such the number of delivery
sites (e.g. costs of training teachers on the intervention in a school).
Moreover, intervention modifications may be necessary when
interventions are scaled up from pilot to national levels.
Consequently, we consulted with senior members of each implemen-
tation team to elicit their expert opinion on the potential scale-up.
Specifically, we elicited input on: (1) potential modifications in
inputs at scale (e.g. implementer organization staff delivering com-
ponents of the intervention during pilot vs local teachers at scale),
(2) potential intervention delivery modifications at scale (e.g.
changes in field worker supervision) and (3) potential magnitude of
scale-up according to delivery platform (e.g. 20 middle schools in an
urban area in the pilot vs all middle schools in the country). A final
list of included modifications, and associated costs, was consequent-
ly reviewed and approved by implementers.
A large number of proposed modifications involved changing the
staff used to deliver the intervention: in IMPower/SOS (Kenya) service
delivery shifted from implementing organization staff to local school
teachers; and in Indashyikirwa (Rwanda) training shifted from being
led by the implementer organization staff to community volunteers.
There was also a reduction in stipends for frontline staff workers
(South Africa, Rwanda and Pakistan), a decrease in supervisory activ-
ities (Ghana and South Africa), a reduction in the intensity of frontline
worker training (Pakistan) and a shortening of the curriculum
(Rwanda) between the pilot phase and the national scale-up. We mod-
elled two scenarios: the first with all suggestions incorporated and a se-
cond, more cautious, scale-up scenario, where we calculated costs at
national scale only accounting for potential changes in inputs. A com-
plete list of assumptions is found in Supplementary Appendix S5.
It should be noted that the impact of modelled changes in inputs
or intervention delivery on the interventions’ effectiveness is uncer-
tain; our scale-up costs should therefore be considered exploratory
and be monitored carefully during implementation.
We excluded intervention development costs at scale, and adap-
tation costs were retained but treated as a fixed cost. Set-up costs,
which included costs associated with community entry, stakeholder
engagement and training of local frontline staff, would need to be
incurred for every new delivery site so were assumed to vary as a
function of the number of delivery sites.
Implementation costs were divided between those incurred in
programme offices (headquarters or regional offices) and delivery
sites. Costs of programme offices were divided into direct and indir-
ect costs. Direct costs (related to core programme delivery, technical
assistance and transport) were multiplied by the number of delivery
sites at scale and indirect costs (related to management, administra-
tion, maintenance and cleaning and other) were multiplied by the
number of projected programme offices at scale. Average implemen-
tation costs per delivery site were multiplied by the estimated num-
ber of delivery sites at scale.
Total costs at scale ¼ adaptation costs
þ ðsite set up costs
 number of delivery sitesÞ
þ

programme office indirectcosts
 number of programme offices

þ ðprogramme office direct costs
 number of delivery sitesÞ
þ ðsite implementation costs
 number of delivery sitesÞ
To determine the total number of delivery sites at scale for
most interventions, we divided the total number of beneficiaries
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at scale by the average number of beneficiaries per site in the
pilot phase (in other words, we assumed a fixed capacity per
site). For IMPower/SOS and RTP, we assumed that the number
of sites was determined by the total number of public primary
schools in Kenya and by the total number of public middle
schools in Pakistan.
The level of expansion of the programme offices necessary at
scale was determined by treating indirect costs as step costs (i.e.
fixed cost until a threshold is crossed), and we assumed that costs
would remain fixed up to the point where the number of delivery
sites tripled. After that point, a duplication in the resources needed
for indirect activities was considered necessary. This assumption
was tested in sensitivity analysis.
To calculate the number of beneficiaries at scale, we first defined
the criteria of inclusion in the target population for each pilot inter-
ventions (e.g. age range or employment status). We then calculated
the total number of people meeting said criteria at the national level.
In the cases of community-based interventions in Ghana and
Rwanda, this meant all adults age 20–59 years in the country:
12 210 626 and 4 976 600 people, respectively (Ghana Statistical
Service, 2012; National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2012).
Although these two interventions targeted adults aged 18–60 years,
our age criteria of beneficiaries at scale are different due to data
availability. For IMPower/SOS, we calculated the total number of
children in primary schools in standard grades 5–8 across Kenya,
estimated to be 3 311 555 students in 23 584 public primary schools
(Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2018). For RTP (Pakistan), we
calculated the total number of children in middle schools to be 4
057 000 in 16 928 schools (Ministry of Federal Education and
Professional Training, Government of Pakistan, 2018). In the case
of SSCF, we estimated all unemployed men and women aged 18–30
years in informal settlements across South Africa to be 490 350 peo-
ple (Housing Development Agency, 2012; Statistics South Africa,
2016, 2018).
Results
Pilot programmes
Start-up costs
Table 2 shows the total economic start-up costs by sub-phase (across
the entire length of the start-up phase). Total costs of the develop-
ment sub-phase varied between 2016 US $36 742 in SSCF (South
Africa) and 2016 US $107 272 in IMPower/SOS (Kenya). Total costs
of the adaptation sub-phase ranged from 2016 US $1773 in SSCF
(South Africa) to 2016 US $782 973 in Indashyikirwa (Rwanda).
Costs of the set-up sub-phase also varied widely, between 2016 US
$42 643 in SSCF (South Africa) and 2016 US $1 363 194 in
Indashyikirwa (Rwanda).
Implementation costs
Table 3 shows the total economic costs of implementation (across
the entire length of the implementation phase) and their breakdown
by input type. Total costs varied greatly: 2016 US $207 523 in SSCF
(South Africa), 2016 US $263 138 in IMPower/SOS (Kenya), 2016
US $279 480 in RRS (Ghana), 2016 US $291 091 in RTP (Pakistan),
2016 US $411 665 in VATU (Zambia) and 2016 US $2 788 019 in
Indashyikirwa (Rwanda).
The capital costs of implementation (i.e. buildings, vehicles and
equipment) were low across all interventions (1–10% of total inter-
vention costs), while recurrent costs made up the majority of total
costs (68–89%). Staff costs (including salaried local and international
staff and volunteer staff, both those receiving small stipends and those
without financial compensation) were the largest cost driver for all
interventions, ranging from nearly 30% of total costs in RRS (Ghana)
to 81% in VATU (Zambia). In community-based interventions
(Ghana and Rwanda), volunteer costs made up 23–27% of staff
costs.
The importance of other recurrent costs varied by intervention.
Recurrent transport costs (i.e. fuel, vehicle maintenance, public
transport/rental) made up between 3% and 9% of total costs across
interventions. Per diem and allowances (for both paid staff and vol-
unteers) made up nearly one-quarter of total costs in RRS (Ghana).
Unit costs
Table 4 shows unit costs across interventions. The cost per frontline
worker trained varied between 2016 US $58 in Indashyikirwa
(Rwanda) and 2016 US $272 in RRS (Ghana). The cost per session
delivered ranged from 2016 US $5 in RTP (Pakistan) to 2016 US
$93 in SSCF (South Africa).
There was a wide range of costs per participant reached: 2016
US $4 in RRS, a community-based intervention in Ghana, 2016 US
$11 in IMPower/SOS, a school-based intervention in Kenya, 2016
US $17 in Indashyikirwa, a couples and community-based interven-
tion in Rwanda, 2016 US $18 in RTP, a school-based intervention
in Pakistan, 2016 US $307 in SSCF, a small group intervention in
South Africa and 2016 US $1324 in VATU, a largely one-to-one
intervention in Zambia.
Uncertainty analysis
Deterministic sensitivity analyses are presented in Figure 1. Total
costs were most sensitive to changes in staff salaries in all interven-
tions except RRS (Ghana). Staff salaries were particularly important
Table 2 Total start-up costs by intervention (2016 US$)
COMBAT/RRS
(Ghana)
IMPower
(Kenya)
RTP
(Pakistan)
Indashyikirwa
(Rwanda)
SSCF
(South Africa)
VATU
(Zambia)
Intervention development Total costs $107 272.13 $36 741.05 $37 815.17
Years of useful life 10 10 10
Annuatized cost $12 575.57 $4307.17 $4433.09
Intervention adaptation Total costs $360 113.15 $39 085.10 $782 972.98 $1772.61 $3315.80
Years of useful life 10 10 10 10 10
Annuatized cost $42 216.25 $9163.93 $168 278.58 $207.80 $388.71
Intervention set-up Total costs $257 104.14 $109 015.83 $62 685.50 $1 363 194.12 $42 642.71 $191 470.04
Years of useful life 5 5 5 5 5 5
Annuatized cost $56 139.86 $23 804.10 $27 375.33 $545 709.39 $9311.23 $41 808.36
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in VATU (Zambia) where a doubling in salaries would increase total
costs by over 77%; reducing them by half would reduce total costs
by over 38%. The useful life of set-up activities (e.g. community
entry and training) was also an important driver, particularly in
RRS (Ghana), Indashyikirwa (Rwanda) and RTP (Pakistan), where
assuming a useful life of set-up of 1 year (as opposed to a base case
of 5 years) would increase total costs by 75%, 45% and 35%, re-
spectively. For VATU (Zambia), the additional uncertainty gener-
ated by differences in staff and research programme reported time
use resulted in potential changes in total costs of between 13.5%
and 13.5%. Likewise, for Indashyikirwa (Rwanda), we found that,
if all relevant costs were assumed to be related to development in-
stead of adaptation, there would be a reduction in overall costs of
4% (see Supplementary Appendices S3 and S4).
Scale-up costs
Table 5 shows the total economic costs and cost per beneficiary
reached in two scenarios of national scale-up: the first takes into ac-
count potential changes in inputs and modifications to the interven-
tion and the second only takes into account changes in inputs.
Total costs of national scale-up varied widely. For the first scen-
ario, the total costs at scale were: 2016 US $32.4 million for RRS
(Ghana), 2016 US $54.9 million for Indashyikirwa (Rwanda), 2016
US $86.6 million for IMPower/SOS (Kenya), 2016 $US 104.3 mil-
lion for SSCF (South Africa) and 2016 $US 168.1 million for RTP
(Pakistan). For the second scenario, the total costs at scale were:
2016 US $36.2 million for RRS (Ghana), 2016 US $57.7 million for
Indashyikirwa (Rwanda), 2016 $US 114 million for SSCF (South
Africa) and 2016 US $168.5 million for RTP (Pakistan). Total costs
were the same in both scenarios for IMPower/SOS (Kenya) as no
modifications to service delivery were assumed.
Total costs have been broken down to show cost changes due to
suggested modifications to inputs, modifications to service delivery
and delivery at scale. Suggested input changes in RTP (Pakistan),
SSCF (South Africa) and Indashyikirwa (Rwanda) led to decreases
in total costs (13%, 5% and 3%, respectively) and to a minor in-
crease in IMPower/SOS (Kenya) (<1%). No changes in inputs were
suggested for the intervention in Ghana.
Changes in service delivery led to further reductions in total costs
in the other interventions: 8% in Ghana (reduction in supervision),
7% in South Africa (reduction in meetings with facilitators and se-
nior facilitators), 3% in Rwanda (reduction in training; training car-
ried out by volunteers instead of staff members) and <1% in
Pakistan (reduction in training). No changes in delivery were sug-
gested for the intervention in Kenya.
Unit costs per beneficiary reached at national scale in the first
scenario were found to be 2016 US $2.65 in RRS (Ghana), 2016 US
$12.03 in Indashyikirwa (Rwanda), 2016 US $26.14 in IMPower/
SOS (Kenya), 2016 US $41.44 in RTP (Pakistan) and 2016 US
$212.68 in SSCF (South Africa). Unit costs in the second scenario
were 2016 US $2.97 in RRS (Ghana), 2016 US $12.65 in
Indashyikirwa (Rwanda), 2016 US $41.53 in RTP (Pakistan) and
2016 US $232.54 in SSCF (South Africa). Unit costs did not change
between the two scenarios in IMPower/SOS (Kenya).
Unit costs at scale were lower than those calculated in the pilot proj-
ects across all interventions, except for the two school-based ones. The
cost per beneficiary reached decreased by 30%, 31% and 37% for RRS
(Ghana), SSCF (South Africa) and Indashyikirwa (Rwanda), respectively,
in the first scenario and 22%, 24% and 33%, respectively, in the second
scenario. On the contrary, unit costs more than doubled for RTP
(Pakistan) and IMPower/SOS (Kenya) in both scenarios.Ta
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We assumed that indirect costs at the programme office-level
would double for every 3-fold increase in the number of deliv-
ery sites. A proportional increase in indirect costs based on the
number of sites (i.e. doubling indirect costs for every 2-fold in-
crease in sites) increased total costs at scale by between 0.1%
in IMPower/SOS (Kenya) and 0.7% in Indashykirwa (Rwanda).
Conversely, a doubling of indirect costs for every 10-fold in-
crease in number of sites decreased total costs at scale from
0.1% in RRS (Ghana) and RTP (Pakistan) to 2.1% in
Indashyikirwa (Rwanda).
Table 4 Unit costs of pilot programmes (2016 US$)
COMBAT/RRS
(Ghana)
IMPower
(Kenya)
RTP
(Pakistan)
Indashyikirwa
(Rwanda)
SSCF
(South Africa)
VATU
(Zambia)
Cost per front line worker trained $272 $220 $70 $58 $211 $191
N ¼ 122 N ¼ 99 N ¼ 21 N ¼ 840a N ¼ 10 N ¼ 45
Cost per session delivered $60 $77 $5 $17 $93
bN ¼ 584 N ¼ 3328 N ¼ 11 443 N ¼ 20 160a N ¼ 801
Cost per participant reached $3.79 $10.94 $18.23 $17.38 $306.53 $1323.68
N ¼ 73 759 N ¼ 24 055 N ¼ 15 968 N ¼ 141 733a N ¼ 677 N ¼ 311
aRefers to community activism component.
bFinal numbers of total number of sessions delivered not provided by implementing organization.
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Figure 1 Tornado diagrams of percentage changes to total costs from deterministic one-way sensitivity analysis of key input variables per country.
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Discussion
Our study presents the total costs and unit costs of developing,
adapting, setting up and implementing six different interventions to
prevent VAWG and the modelled costs of scale-up of five interven-
tions. This is the first comprehensive cost dataset for VAWG preven-
tion, and it demonstrates the application of a method for estimating
costs in line with global health costing reference cases. The interven-
tions costed vary in terms of delivery platforms, methods and target
populations. Given the dearth of evidence in this area, our work rep-
resents a sizeable and valuable contribution for decision-makers and
policymakers wishing to plan and advocate the scale-up of VAWG
prevention programmes globally.
We divided start-up costs into three sub-phases: intervention
development, adaptation and set-up, to inform other pilots and
the expansion of services across countries. Development was
costed in Kenya, South Africa and Zambia (in all cases at least
some of the development occurred prior to ‘What Works’) and
costs ranged from 2016 US $37 000 to 2016 US $107 000. These
figures are higher than those reported for IMAGE (2004 US
$13 877 adjusted to 2016 US $17 353) and lower than those
reported for SASA! (2011 US $139 000 adjusted to 2016 US
$149 944). There was a wider range in adaptation costs: from
2016 US $1800 SSCF (South Africa) to 2016 US $783 000 in
Indashyikirwa (Rwanda), reflecting different intensities in the
process. Whereas, in South Africa, adaptation involved 1 day of
post-pilot work in making content and delivery more context spe-
cific, the process of adapting SASA! to Rwanda was complex and
time-consuming (Stern et al., 2018). As an example, a month-long
curriculum pre-testing phase, where trainings were followed by
focus groups, led to substantial changes to the programme,
including additional training time, modification of conceptual
framework to fit local standards and extended provision of psy-
chosocial support for staff.
Table 5 Total and unit cost estimates at scale-up (2016 US$)
COMBAT/RRS
(Ghana)
IMPower
(Kenya)
RTP
(Pakistan)
Indashyikirwa
(Rwanda)
SSCF
(South Africa)
Pilot scale: changes
in inputs (Total
costs )
Start-up costs $56 139.86 $66 778.50 $36 539.26 $620 936.39 $9519.04
Implementation
costs
$223 340.16 $197 117.98 $217 704.81 $2 074 031.31 $188 650.68
Total costs $279 480.03 $263 896.47 $254 244.07 $2 694 967.70 $198 169.72
Pilot scale: interven-
tion modifica-
tions (Total
Start-up costs $56 139.86 $66 778.50 $36 109.01 $533 783.46 $9519.04
Implementation
costs
$199 800.49 $197 117.98 $217 704.81 $2 074 031.31 $174 998.45
costs) Total costs $255 940.35 $263 896.47 $253 813.10 $2 607 814.78 $184 517.49
Scenario 1: national
scale-up (incl.
changes in inputs
and intervention
modifications)
(Total costs)
Start-up costs $9 293 820.29 $10 769 550.87 $22 815 550.79 $14 321 736.74 $6 744 318.98
Implementation
costs
$23 082 928.11 $75 801 532.93 $145 310 193.75 $40 592 264.69 $97 544 072.20
Total costs $32 376 748.40 $86 571 083.79 $168 125 744.53 $54 914 001.43 $104 288 391.17
Scenario 1: number of beneficiaries at
national scale-up
12 210 626 3 311 555 4 057 000 4 563 077 490 350
Scenario 1: cost per beneficiary at national
scale-up
$2.65 $26.14 $41.44 $12.03 $212.68
Scenario 1: changes in cost per beneficiary
between pilot projects and national
scale-up (%)
30.02 þ238.43 þ227.33 36.71 30.62
Scenario 2: national
scale-up (incl.
changes in inputs
only) (Total
costs)
Start-up costs $9 293 820.29 $10 769 550.87 $23 179 644.38 $17 127 608.30 $6 744 318.98
Implementation
costs
$26 914 806.95 $75 801 532.93 $145 310 193.75 $40 592 264.69 $107 282 331.88
Total costs $36 208 627.24 $86 571 083.79 $168 489 838.12 $57 719 872.99 $114 026 650.86
Scenario 2: number of beneficiaries at
national scale-up
12 210 626 3 311 555 4 057 000 4 563 077 490 350
Scenario 2: cost per beneficiary at national
scale-up
$2.97 $26.14 $41.53 $12.65 $232.54
Scenario 2: changes in cost per beneficiary
between pilot projects and national
scale-up (%)
21.74 þ238.43 þ227.82 33.47 24.14
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Whether the high cost of adaptation is warranted is difficult to
determine. Ensuring that interventions are context specific is par-
ticularly important for interventions targeting social norms. If
existing social norms are not understood by implementers, pro-
grammes that aim to change them may not be successful. For ex-
ample, messaging from SASA! was adjusted to the Rwandan
social context (e.g. changing emphasis of activism material from
HIV to economic empowerment) and to reflect changes in the
intervention (e.g. more explicit emphasis on couples taking action
together).
There was also a wide range of set-up costs across the interven-
tions, from 2016 US $43 000 in SSCF (South Africa) to 2016 US
$1 363 000 in Indashyikirwa (Rwanda). Our set-up cost estimates
are in all cases (except for SSCF in South Africa), higher than those
published in the literature; total cost estimates for set-up for IMAGE
were 2004 US $61 000 (adjusted to 2016 US $76 280) in the trial
phase and 2004 US $58 000 (adjusted to 2016 US $72 529) in the
scale-up, although these costs only include training and exclude
community entry costs.
Our set-up costs include training and other community entry
activities, such as recruitment of frontline staff, meetings with stake-
holders and demand creation, all of which have to be replicated in
each geographical area where the implementation occurs. The high
costs in Rwanda can be partially explained by Indashyikirwa’s wide
geographical reach: unlike the other interventions, which were
rolled out in one or two districts or cities, Indashyikirwa was imple-
mented across seven districts in three regions of the country.
Indashyikirwa also required the training of four distinct cadres of
volunteers per district (couples, community activities, women’s safe
space facilitators and opinion leaders); in other interventions, only
one type of frontline staff was recruited and trained. Lastly,
Indashyikirwa was set up and implemented by three non-profit
organizations, each with specific overhead cost structures.
We made an assumption that the useful life of the set-up phase
was 5 years, based on an average political cycle. When tested in sen-
sitivity analysis, costs were sensitive to this assumption in Ghana,
Rwanda and Pakistan, where community members were trained to
deliver services, a process requiring substantial investment.
Avoiding attrition of volunteers may be an important factor in
ensuring a longer useful life of the set-up sub-phase and, consequent-
ly, maintaining lower costs in the long term.
The cost per frontline worker trained varied between 2016 US
$58 in Indashyikirwa (Rwanda) and 2016 US $272 in RRS (Ghana),
both interventions where volunteers were trained to carry out com-
munity outreach activities. However, the unit cost for Indashyikirwa
is potentially underestimated; this figure only includes the costs of
community activism training and excludes costs of a prior
workshop-based training with couples, from which the community
activists were subsequently selected (however, the costs of the cou-
ples’ training is included in the total set-up costs). Should funders
consider implementing only a sub-selection of components, further
work could explore costs disaggregated by activity in multi-compo-
nent interventions.
The cost per beneficiary-facing session delivered also varied be-
tween 2016 US $5 per school session in RTP (Pakistan) and 2016
US $93 in SSCF (South Africa). Differences in cost can be explained
by the fact that sessions in Pakistan were delivered by volunteers
with relatively low stipends and were short in duration, whereas in
SSCF the target audience was young adults, requiring more intensive
support in livelihoods development.
The cost per beneficiary reached varied greatly: between 2016
US $4 in RRS (Ghana) and 2016 US $1324 in VATU (Zambia).
Cost per beneficiary in Indashyikirwa were within the same range as
in SASA! (2011 US $15–23 adjusted to 2016 US $16–25 in the lat-
ter). The wide range in unit costs are primarily explained by the in-
tensity of interaction and staff type required to deliver each
intervention and, in particular, by the frontline staff-to-beneficiary
ratio. More resources are needed to teach a small number of people
(or one person) vs holding public, open-air activities for, at times,
hundreds of people at once.
We have presented the modelled total and unit costs of the inter-
ventions’ national scale-up. Cost per beneficiary reached ranged
from 2016 US $3 in RRS (Ghana) to 2016 US $233 in SSCF (South
Africa). The costs per beneficiary reached at scale were lower than
those in pilot programmes in three interventions: RRS (Ghana),
Indashyikirwa (Rwanda) and SSCF (South Africa). The only current
ex-post evidence of scale-up costs comes from IMAGE, which was
expanded from the trial setting covering 855 women (in four study
villages) to 3453 within the local area; the cost per participant
reached fell by 70% (from 2004 US $43, adjusted to 2016 US $54
to 2004 US $13, adjusted to 2016 US $16). Comparatively more
modest decreases (22–37%) were estimated in RRS, Indashyikirwa
and SSCF. However, in IMAGE, expansion occurred within the
same geographical area as the pilot and so additional costs required
were proportionally smaller. In our model, expansion occurs
nationwide.
The reduction in unit costs in the scale-up scenario in three of
our interventions is in line with potential economies of scale: unit
costs decrease as unit of outputs increase due to the smoothing of
fixed costs across a greater number of units (Guinness et al., 2005;
Kumaranayake, 2008). However, the cost per beneficiary increased
substantially in both school-based interventions: IMPower/SOS
(Kenya) and RTP (Pakistan). This increase can be explained by the
cost structure of the interventions, delivery platforms and the num-
ber of beneficiaries reached. In the other three interventions, we
assumed a set number of beneficiaries per site using pilot data and
the number of sites at scale was estimated proportionally. In the
case of IMPower/SOS and RTP, the number of sites at scale was pre-
determined by the number of existing schools in the country, regard-
less of the number of students in each school. Whereas the pilot
interventions were implemented in high-density urban areas, with
an average of 444 eligible students per school in Kenya and 798 in
Pakistan, at a national level, the average number of eligible students
per school was 140 and 240, respectively. In addition, in the case of
IMPower/SOS, the changes in inputs assumed at scale increased
total costs (<1%), as the assumed salary of a teacher was higher
than that of the implementer organization staff delivering the inter-
vention at pilot level.
Some have speculated that VAWG prevention interventions
could be delivered at scale in an efficient manner given large fixed
costs (e.g. developing training curricula) (Remme et al., 2015).
However, the degree of efficiency at scale depends on the delivery
platform. While other interventions, such as media campaigns, may
incur small incremental scale-up costs, labour-intensive interven-
tions require greater increases in variable costs and may not be as ef-
ficient at scale.
Given that the majority of costs are fixed at the delivery site
level, a greater number of beneficiaries per site is will decrease unit
costs at scale. Community-based interventions can have more flex-
ible delivery platforms and therefore programmes could set the num-
ber of cadres of front-line staff proportionally to the size of the adult
population of a specific geographical area to meet target unit costs.
Small group-based interventions could see reductions in unit costs
by increasing the number of participants per site, although this needs
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to be weighed against potential changes in the quality of the pro-
gramme stemming from different tutor-to-participant ratios.
School-based interventions and other interventions relying on
existing institutional infrastructures, on the other hand, will have a
fixed number of beneficiaries. To reduce unit costs, programmes
could focus on high-density areas, although this would penalize low-
density and hard-to-reach communities. Furthermore, the co-
delivery of other interventions within the same school platforms
(such as health interventions) could help IMPower/SOS and RTP
lower unit costs and achieve economies of scope (i.e. reductions in
unit costs as the types of services increase). In addition, in schools
with fewer students, facilitators could deliver each session to more
than one class at a time, thus reducing the cost per student reached.
Alternatively, different models of delivery could shift activities
from volunteers to school teachers, as has been done in other set-
tings by the implementers of RTP in Pakistan. However, this model
has not been evaluated in a trial setting and, therefore, there is un-
certainty around its effectiveness. A shift from head coaches to
teachers could reduce financial costs for the implementing organiza-
tion; whether this reduces or increases economic costs depends on
the degree to which teachers have idle time or whether VAWG pre-
vention activities displace other teaching duties creating a need for
further staffing.
Limitations
Our study suffers from several limitations. Development costs were
not captured in three of the interventions costed as records were un-
available. While we report total development costs where available,
we exclude annuitized development costs from implementation cal-
culations to ensure comparability. It was difficult to differentiate be-
tween development and adaptation costs in Indashyikirwa.
However, sensitivity analysis showed that assumptions on the allo-
cation of these costs had little effect on total costs.
We collected costs at different time points, and some data were
captured retrospectively. While not problematic when reviewing fi-
nancial records, capturing time use data post-facto through inter-
views can be subject to recall bias.
In our scale-up analysis, we assume that costs of adaptation will
not be replicated when the intervention is scaled up within the same
country. However, this presupposes a high degree of in-country
homogeneity, which varies by setting.
Furthermore, we model the costs of expanding each intervention
in the country in which it was trialled. However, scale-up may prove
more complex, involving a combination of different interventions
targeting different types of beneficiaries through different platforms
depending on need (e.g. implementing community-based interven-
tions only in rural areas and school-based ones only in cities).
Our data could be used to plan scaling up programmes in the
countries where they were piloted. However, while they could also
be used to estimate costs in other countries, it is important to reflect
on issues of transferability. We have already mentioned the high
adaptation costs involved in Indashyikirwa; whether further adapta-
tions in other countries would be as costly is uncertain. Staff costs
made up the majority of total costs in our study and, thus, under-
standing how salaries vary between countries is important.
Furthermore, these interventions require different types of skilled
and semi-skilled workers who may not be readily available in some
countries, potentially increasing training costs. Changes to the inter-
vention’s length and intensity of treatment, which would have cost
implications, could also potentially be necessary depending on the
receptiveness of the target population. Costs at scale may also vary
in other countries depending on the availability of similar delivery
platforms.
Our work provides a substantive contribution to the economic
literature on VAWG prevention but further work is needed. While
unit costs are relevant for purposes of budgeting and ensuring finan-
cial sustainability, they do not explain whether the intervention has
ensured good value for money. More resource-intensive interven-
tions (such as those delivered to smaller groups) may be more effect-
ive; and so cost-effectiveness analyses are required to shed light on
whether the additional costs represent good value for money.
As part of the process of calculating scale-up costs, we engaged
implementers to propose service adaptations potentially implement-
able at scale. However, whether changes to programme inputs and
delivery could lead to changes in effectiveness is unknown. Further
empirical work is needed to see if our estimated costs are achieved at
scale and understand the trade-off between reduced costs in pro-
gramme delivery and sustained effectiveness in VAWG prevention
interventions. However, if resources required to carry out empirical
work, particularly trials, are not available, other techniques such as
decision analytic modelling could be considered.
While our analysis gives an indication of changes in unit costs at
scale, additional costs needed to deliver services to the hard to reach
are not explicitly modelled. Further work is needed to understand
the optimal scale to which service delivery should be extended.
Moreover, although increasing financial, human and capital resour-
ces is a necessary part of scaling up interventions, these increases on
their own may not guarantee a successful scale-up (World Health
Organization, 2008). Creation of adequate demand, strategic
sequencing of expansion and engagement with local stakeholders
and institutions may also be necessary and may require additional
resourcing.
Conclusions
VAWG presents a substantial human rights and societal challenge
globally. Interventions that prevent VAWG demonstrate a wide
range of costs, varying according to the geographical reach, number
of intervention components, platforms and the complexity of adapt-
ing the intervention to the country. ‘What Works’ has proved a
unique opportunity to estimate and compare these costs using stand-
ardized methods across different intervention models, providing a
substantial source of costs to assist those planning the scale-up of
VAWG interventions going forward.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at Health Policy and Planning online.
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